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Abstract
What are the equilibrium features of a dynamic ￿nancial market where traders care
about their reputation for ability? We modify a standard sequential trading model to
include traders with career concerns. We show that this market cannot be informationally
e¢ cient: there is no equilibrium in which prices converge to the true value, even after
an in￿nite sequence of trades. We characterize the most informative equilibrium of this
game and show that an increase in the strength of the traders￿reputational concerns has
a negative e⁄ect on the extent of information that can be aggregated in equilibrium but a
positive e⁄ect on market liquidity. The robustness of our results is probed from a variety
of angles.
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11 Introduction
The substantial increase in the institutional ownership of corporate equity around the world in
recent decades has underscored the importance of studying the e⁄ects of institutional trade
on asset prices.1 Institutions, and their employees, may be guided by incentives not fully
captured by standard models in ￿nance. For example, consider the case of US mutual funds
which make up a signi￿cant proportion of institutional investors in US equity markets. An
important body of empirical work highlights the fact that mutual funds (e.g. Chevalier and
Ellison [8]) and their employees (Chevalier and Ellison [9]) both face career concerns: they
are interested in enhancing their reputation with their respective principals and sometimes
indulge in perverse actions (e.g. excessive risk taking) in order to achieve this. Given the
importance of institutions in equity markets, it is plausible to expect that such behavior may
a⁄ect equilibrium quantities in these markets. What are the equilibrium features of a market
in which a large proportion of traders care about their reputation?
While a growing body of literature examines the e⁄ects of agency con￿ icts on asset pricing,
the explicit modeling of reputation in ￿nancial markets is in its infancy.2 Dasgupta and
Prat [11] present a two-period micro-founded model of career concerns in ￿nancial markets
to examine the e⁄ect of reputation in enhancing trading volume. However, that analysis is
done for a static market: each asset is traded only once.
In this paper, in contrast, we study a multi-period sequential trade market in which some
traders care about their reputations. We show that the dynamic properties of this market
are very di⁄erent from those of standard markets.
1.1 Summary of Results
We present the most parsimonious model that captures the essence of our arguments. Much
of our model is standard. We present a T-period sequential trade market for a single (Arrow)
asset where all transactions occur via uninformed market makers who are risk neutral and
competitive (following Glosten and Milgrom [16] and Kyle [17]) and quote bid and ask prices
to re￿ ect the informational content of order ￿ ow. In addition there is a large group of liquidity-
driven noise traders who trade for exogenous reasons that are unrelated to the liquidation
1On the New York Stock Exchange the percentage of outstanding corporate equity held by institutional
investors increased from 7.2% in 1950 to 49.8% in 2002 (NYSE Factbook 2003). For OECD countries as
a whole, institutional ownership now accounts for around 30% of corporate equity (Nielsen [20]). Allen [1]
presents persuasive arguments for the importance of ￿nancial institutions to asset pricing.
2For example, Allen and Gorton [2] and Dow and Gorton [15] examine the asset pricing implications of
non-reputational agency con￿ icts. Reputational concerns are implicit in the contractual forms assumed in the
general equilibrium models of Cuoco and Kaniel [10] and Vayanos [29].
2value of the asset.
Our only innovation is that we introduce a large group of reputationally-concerned traders
(whom we call fund managers), who trade on behalf of other (inactive) investors. These
traders receive a payo⁄ that depends both on the direct pro￿ts they produce and on the
reputation that they earn with their principals.3 Their reputation is determined endogenously
by Bayesian investors, in a way that will be described shortly.
The fund managers can be of two types (smart or dumb) and receive informative signals
about the asset liquidation value, where the precision depends on their (unknown) type. In
each trading round either a randomly selected fund manager or a noise trader interact with
the market maker. The asset payo⁄ is realized at time T and all payments are made.
At time T, every fund manager is evaluated on the basis of all available information, with
the exception of the agent￿ s private signal. This implies that each investor can observe the
liquidation of the asset and the portfolio choice of his own agent.4 This assumption is plausible
for relatively sophisticated investors, such as corporate pension plans, investment banks,
insurance companies, and hedge fund clients. It may instead be an unrealistic requirement
for retail mutual fund investors, who typically have limited knowledge of their fund￿ s portfolio
composition.5
We present the following results.
1. We begin with an impossibility result. We show that, in this market of career-concerned
traders, prices never converge to true liquidation value, even after an in￿nite sequence
of trades. If fund managers trade according to their private signal, the price evolves to
incorporate such private information. Over time, the price should converge to the true
liquidation value. However, as the uncertainty over the liquidation value is resolved,
two things happen. First, the fund managers have less opportunity to make trading
pro￿ts because the price is close to the liquidation value. The expected pro￿t for a
fund manager who trades according to his signal is always positive, but it tends to zero
as the price becomes more precise. Second, taking a ￿contrarian￿position (e.g. selling
when the price has been going up) starts to carry an endogenous reputational cost:
with high probability, the trade will turn out to be incorrect and the fund manager will
￿look dumb￿in the eyes of (rational) principals. Because of the combination of these
two e⁄ects, when the price becomes su¢ ciently precise fund managers begin to behave
3The principals may be line managers at mutual fund companies with oversight over the particular fund
manager￿ s activities, or, directly, the investors who have placed their funds with the company.
4For all our core results, it is irrelevant whether the investor observes the portfolio choice of other fund
manager besides his.
5See Prat [23] for a discussion of the role of portfolio disclosure in delegated portfolio management with
career concerns.
3in a conformist way: their trade stops re￿ ecting their private information. From then
on, there is no information aggregation whatsoever and the price stays constant.
2. We then investigate how much information can be aggregated by equilibrium prices
despite the presence of career concerns. We do this by characterizing the most infor-
mative trading strategies that can be sustained in equilibrium following each possible
transaction price. We show that, as long as the price leaves su¢ cient uncertainty about
liquidation values, sincere trade can be supported in equilibrium. Thus, each man-
ager￿ s signal can be fully revealed via his trade. However, as uncertainty is resolved,
equilibrium trade becomes partially or completely uninformative.
We show a number of monotonicity results, which relate the strength of career concerns
with the extent of information revelation. For every price level, the amount of infor-
mation revealed in equilibrium is decreasing in the importance of career concerns. We
also consider the maximal and minimal ranges of equilibrium prices that can support
completely sincere and fully conformist trading respectively, and characterize how such
price ranges evolve with the importance of career concerns.
3. We consider the impact of career concerns on other core ￿nancial market variables:
market liquidity and price volatility. We show that increasing career concerns increases
liquidity and decreases volatility. Thus, increased institutional presence in a market
decreases price informativeness, but has potentially bene￿cial impacts via liquidity and
volatility. Our analysis provides theoretical underpinnings for a number of recent papers
on herding in ￿nancial markets, which will be discussed in more detail in the Conclusion.
4. Finally, we examine a number of natural extensions of the model. The baseline model is
presented with a binary asset liquidation value. We show that our impossibility result
extends to richer payo⁄ spaces. Further, in our baseline model we assumed that fund
managers were unaware of their type. We extend the model to demonstrate that as
long as self-knowledge is not too accurate, our main conclusion remains valid.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper brings together two in￿ uential strands of the literature. The ￿rst strand concerns
the theory of dynamic ￿nancial markets with asymmetrically informed traders (Glosten and
Milgrom [16] and Kyle [17]). The second strand focusses on the analysis of career concerns
in sequential investment decision-making (Scharfstein and Stein [24]). Models in the ￿rst
strand consider a full-￿ edged ￿nancial market with endogenously determined prices but do
not allow traders to have career concerns. Models in the second strand do the exact opposite:
4they analyze the role of reputational concerns in a partial equilibrium setting, where prices
are exogenously ￿xed.
In the ￿rst strand, Glosten and Milgrom [16] have shown that in dynamic ￿nancial mar-
kets the price must tend to the true liquidation value in the long term. More recently,
Avery and Zemsky [4] have shown that statistical information cascades ￿ la Banerjee [5]
and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch [6] are impossible in such a market.6 After every
investment decision, the price adjusts to re￿ ect the expected value of the asset based on
information revealed by past trades. Thus, traders with private information stand to make
a pro￿t by trading according to their signals. But by doing so, they release additional pri-
vate information into the public domain. In the long run, the market achieves informational
e¢ ciency.
In the second strand, Scharfstein and Stein [24] have shown that managers who care
about their reputation for ability may choose to ignore relevant private information and
instead mimic past investment decisions of other managers.7 This is because a manager who
possesses ￿contrarian￿information (for instance he observes a negative signal for an asset
that has experienced price growth) jeopardizes his reputation if he decides to trade according
to his signal. Scharfstein and Stein￿ s analysis is carried out in partial equilibrium: prices
play no informational role in such an analysis. For a general analysis of this class of partial
equilibrium models see Ottaviani and Sorensen [21].8
Our results provide a clean theoretical link between the two types of economies represented
in these two strands of the literature. On the one hand, in ￿Glosten-Milgrom type￿economies,
prices play an informational role and agents are motivated purely by trading pro￿ts. In
such economies, agents always utilize their information and prices always converge to true
liquidation value in the long run. On the other hand, in ￿Scharfstein-Stein type￿economies
prices are assumed to play no informational role and agents care only about ex post reputation
6A word of caution is in order here. There is almost universal agreement in the literature on the meaning
of a cascade, which is the de￿nition we have used above (an equilibrium event in which information gets
trapped, and agents￿actions no longer reveal any of their valuable private information). However, there is
little agreement on the de￿nition of the term herds (for example, substantively di⁄erent de￿nitions are used
by Avery and Zemsky [4], Smith and Sorensen [27], and Chari and Kehoe [7]). In the interest of clarity,
throughout this paper we shall restrict attention to cascades only.
Under additional assumptions, Avery and Zemsky [4] show that a form of herd behaviour may occur in the
presence of prices. However, in all versions of their model cascades are absent and prices always converge to
true liquidation value (Avery and Zemsky Proposition 2). Recently, Park and Sabourian [22] have explored
generalizations of the necessary conditions for herds in Avery and Zemsky￿ s model. As in Avery and Zemsky,
however, cascades cannot arise in their model.
7Other more recent papers in this strand include, for example, Avery and Chevalier [3] and Trueman [28].
8The link between this paper and Ottaviani and Sorensen [21] is discussed in more detail at the end of
Section 3.
5for ability. In such economies, agents engage in conformist behavior in order to enhance their
reputation. Our central observation is that if traders care even slightly about reputation
in a Glosten-Milgrom type economy, then prices can play only a limited informational role.
In order to converge to true value, prices must get close enough to true value. But when
this happens, pro￿ts become unimportant, and reputational concerns become predominant.
Then, the Glosten-Milgrom economy metamorphoses into a Scharfstein-Stein economy. But
in the latter, conformism arises, and thus prices cannot incorporate further information.
In addition, by studying career concerns in ￿nancial equilibrium, we are able to study the
e⁄ects of micro-founded reputation-driven conformism on ￿nancial market quantities (prices,
informational e¢ ciency, trade patterns, liquidity, and volatility), which leads to relevant
predictions on observable market variables, as discussed above.
Other authors (Lee [18] and Chari and Kehoe [7]) have argued that information cascades
can occur when prices are endogenous. However, their arguments hinge on a market break-
down: trade stops altogether.9 Instead, in our model cascades occur in a functioning ￿nancial
market with trade.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the model.
Section 3 demonstrates the impossibility of full information aggregation. Section 4 character-
izes the relationship between the importance of career concerns and the extent of equilibrium
information aggregation. Extensions are examined in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The economy lasts T discrete periods: 1;2;:::T. Trade can occur in periods 1;2:::T ￿1. The
market trades an Arrow security, which has equiprobable liquidation value v = 0 or 1; which
is revealed at time T.
In practice, the asset could be a bond with maturity date T with a serious possibility
of default. It could also be the common stock of a company which is expected to make an
announcement of great importance (earnings, merger, etc.) at time T: all traders know that
the announcement will occur but they may have di⁄erent information on the content of the
announcement.
There are a large number of fund managers and noise traders. At each period t 2
f1;2;:::;T ￿ 1g either a fund manager or a noise trader enters the market with probabil-
ities 1 ￿ ￿ and ￿ 2 (0;1) respectively. The traders interact with a market maker and can
9In Lee￿ s [18] model the existence of a transaction cost to trading can prevent traders with relatively
inaccurate signals from trading, thus trapping private information in an illiquid market. In Chari and Kehoe
[7], traders have the option of exiting the market (by making an outside investment) and may in equilibrium
￿nd it optimal to exit before further information arrives, thus, again, trapping private information.
6issue market orders (at) to buy (at = 1) one unit or sell (at = 0) one unit of the asset. The
market maker posts ask (pa
t) and bid (pb
t) prices at which he will sell or buy one unit of the
asset respectively. As is standard in the literature (Glosten and Milgrom [16], Kyle [17]), we
assume that the market maker is risk-neutral and competitive, and thus the quoted prices
will be equal to the expected value of v conditional on the order history.
Denote the history of observed orders at the beginning of period t (not including the
order at time t) by ht. Let pt = E(vjht), pa
t = E(vjht;buy), pb
t = E(vjht;sell). Note that
at any time t, pt plays a dual role: on the one hand it is the most recent transaction price;
on the other, it represents the public belief about v at the beginning of period t. We shall,
therefore, refer to pt below interchangeably as the ￿price￿or the ￿public belief￿ , depending
on the context.
The fund manager can be of two types: ￿ 2 fb;gg with Pr(￿ = g) = ￿ 2 (0;1). The type
is independent of v. If at time t a fund manager appears, he receives a signal st 2 f0;1g with
distribution




￿ ￿b < ￿g ￿ 1:
Fund managers do not know their type. Noise traders buy or sell a unit with equal probability
independent of v.










t if at = 1
pb
t ￿ v if at = 0
If a fund manager traded at time t, his actions are observed at time T. Principals (e.g.,
line managers in the fund management ￿rm) form a posterior belief about the manager￿ s
type based upon all observables, namely the whole history of trades and prices (hT) and the
realized liquidation value (v). We call this the manager￿ s reputation and de￿ne it to be:
rt (hT;v) = Pr(￿t = gjhT;v):
The fund manager at time t receives utility
ut = ￿￿t + (1 ￿ ￿)rt;
where 1 ￿ ￿ 2 (0;1) measures the importance of career concerns.10 A game ￿ is de￿ned by
the values of ￿ve parameters (￿;￿b;￿g;￿;￿).
10Our qualitative results hold for a much larger class of payo⁄functions: ut = ￿￿(￿t)+(1￿￿)R(rt) where ￿
and R are increasing and piecewise continuous functions. Such an extension increases algebra without adding
to intuition. See Dasgupta and Prat [12] for details.
7Let ￿t
st (ht) be the probability that the manager plays at = 1 given history ht and signal
realization st. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game is a collection f￿t
st (ht)gT￿1
t=1 for
every possible history ht and signal realization st, satisfying the standard de￿nition.
Finally, in a given PBE of the game, at a given time t; and for a given history ht, we
denote by ￿￿t
st the expected excess pro￿t for the manager who has observed signal st from
buying rather than selling. Similarly, denote the expected excess reputation by ￿rt
st and the
expected excess overall utility by ￿ut
st: Also, denote the private expectation of the manager
about v after observing history ht and his signal st by vt
st. In our subsequent discussion, we
will often hold time and history constant, and denote these simply by ￿￿s;￿rs;￿us and vs
respectively.
Our model departs from Glosten and Milgrom￿ s [16] only in that our informed traders
￿the fund managers ￿care about reputation as well as pro￿t. If we set ￿ = 1, our model
becomes a special case of Glosten-Milgrom, and all their results apply as stated.
3 The Impossibility of Full Revelation
If there are no career concerns (￿ = 1), the unique equilibrium of this game is a sincere
equilibrium (Glosten and Milgrom [16], Avery and Zemsky [4]): for any t;ht, ￿t
1(ht) = 1 and
￿t
0(ht) = 0, that is, every trader who receives an opportunity to trade does so according to
his information (at = st). This means that prices impound information and pt ! v as t ! 1.
The interesting case is then when ￿ < 1. We can now state our main result:





such that in any equilib-










, there exists an open set of games ￿ such that in any equilibrium of





For an equilibrium to be informative, the actions of traders who receive signal s = 1 must
di⁄er at least probabilistically from the actions of traders who receive signal s = 0, i.e., ￿1
must be di⁄erent from ￿0. For a given history, and a corresponding set of public beliefs,
informative equilibrium strategies must, therefore, satisfy either ￿1 > ￿0 or ￿1 < ￿0. Our
proof shows that, when prices are su¢ ciently extreme, neither of these is possible. The proof
of the result (as well as those of all subsequent results) is in the appendix. Here, we provide
some intuition for why the result is true.
There are three crucial (endogenous) properties of our ￿nancial market that drive our
results. The ￿rst property is that pro￿t motives always encourage traders to trade sincerely.
Private information is valuable, and in the presence of noise, prices re￿ ect only part of this
8information. It always enhances the pro￿ts of traders to follow their private information.
The second property is that when transaction prices, and therefore public beliefs, indicate
that some liquidation value (say, v = x) of the asset is su¢ ciently more likely than the other,
the reputational incentives of a career-concerned fund manager encourage him to act in a
manner that will make the principal believe that the manager received the signal that is
more likely to arise when v = x. This enhances the manager￿ s reputation, because types are
di⁄erentiated by their relative information precision. Finally, the third property is that when
prices become su¢ ciently extreme, and thus su¢ ciently precise, trading pro￿ts become small
because the beliefs of informed and uninformed traders converge.
We shall now argue that a combination of two or more of these ingredients rule out
equilibria where, when prices are high or low enough, it is possible to have either ￿1 > ￿0 or
￿1 < ￿0.
First, consider the case in which ￿1 > ￿0. It is easy to see that the combination of the
second and third properties rule out informative equilibria of this type for high enough or
low enough prices. In an equilibrium with ￿1 > ￿0, when the principal sees a manager buy,
he attaches high probability to the manager having received signal 1. This enhances the
reputation of the manager, if, ex post, the liquidation value turns out to be 1. If instead the
liquidation value turns out to be 0, the manager￿ s reputation su⁄ers. Consider a manager
who has received signal 1 and suppose that transaction prices p get very small (we loosely
write ￿p ! 0￿ ). The third property implies trading pro￿t becomes small (￿￿1 ! 0) and
has a small impact on trading decisions. However, if p ! 0 in an informative equilibrium,
it becomes very likely that v = 0. Thus, the second property implies that the manager￿ s
reputational incentives will encourage him to take the action that will make the principal
believe that he has received signal 0. Thus, from a reputational perspective, this manager
must prefer to sell instead of buy (￿r1 < 0). As pro￿t motivations diminish and reputational
motivations become one-sided, eventually the latter dominates the former (￿u1 < 0) and the
manager ignores his private information: ￿1 = 0. Thus, for su¢ ciently extreme p, it cannot
be the case that ￿1 > ￿0.
Consider next the case in which ￿1 < ￿0. The combination of the ￿rst two properties rules
out this type of equilibrium when transaction prices are su¢ ciently extreme. In an equilibrium
with ￿1 < ￿0, when the principal sees a manager buy, he attaches high probability to the
manager having received signal 0. This enhances the reputation of the manager if, ex post,
the liquidation value turns out to be 0. Consider a manager who has received signal 1. The
￿rst property implies that pro￿t motivations drive this manager to buy (￿￿1 > 0). However,
since ￿1 < ￿0, it must be the case that ￿1 < 1. This implies that ￿u1 ￿ 0, which can
only arise if the reputational value of buying is strictly lower than the reputational value of
9selling (￿r1 < 0). Now suppose that p ! 0. In an informative equilibrium, this means that
it is very likely that v = 0. The second property now implies that the manager can gain
reputationally by signalling that he received s = 0, which he can do only by buying! Thus,
it must be reputationally advantageous for him to buy rather than sell (￿r1 > 0) for low
enough public beliefs, contradicting our conclusion above. Thus, for su¢ ciently extreme p,
it cannot be the case that ￿1 < ￿0.
Thus, the only possible equilibrium actions for su¢ ciently extreme prices involves ￿1 = ￿0.
But since these actions are uninformative, such trades do not move the price further.
The price bounds identi￿ed in Proposition 1 are independent of history and time, and
therefore of the length of the game T. This is because, while equilibrium strategies can
in general be time and history dependent, we have shown that if prices ever attain our
bounds, the continuation equilibrium is unique, independent of history and time, and dictates
complete conformism.11
The second part of the proposition establishes that the non-revelation region is non-trivial.
For any p < 1
3, there exist a positive measure of games (the space of games is the space on
which the parameters (￿;￿b;￿g;￿;￿) are de￿ned) in which transaction prices can never be
lower than p or higher than 1 ￿ p. The p < 1
3 bound comes from the worst-case scenario
for information revelation, namely when career concerns are very important (￿ ! 0), smart
managers are very smart (￿g ! 1), dumb managers are very dumb (￿b ! 1
2), and most
managers are dumb (￿ ! 0).
Our result bears a connection to Ottaviani and Sorensen [21], who provide a general
analysis of reputational cheap talk and show that full information transmission is generically
impossible. Of particular interest to the present paper is their Proposition 9, where they
consider a sequence of experts providing reports on a common state of the world and they
show that informational herding must occur. Our result is di⁄erent because: (a) we show the
necessity of informational cascades (while Ottaviani and Sorensen prove that herding must
occur but they cannot exclude that the true value is revealed in the limit); (b) our experts
have a pro￿t motive as well as a reputational motive; and (c) most importantly, our model
is embedded in a ￿nancial market.
4 How Much Information Can Be Aggregated?
We have just shown that the presence of reputational concerns preclude the existence of
equilibria in which prices perfectly aggregate information in the long-run. We now turn to
11Needless to say, while are results are formally valid for all T, they are more interesting for large T. For
su¢ ciently small T the range of possible transaction prices in the game without career concerns (￿ = 1) may
lie within the bounds identi￿ed in Proposition 1.
10a natural complementary question: How much information can be revealed in equilibrium,
despite the presence of career concerns?
We address this question in two interrelated ways. First, we consider the most informative
form of trading: sincere trading. We show that there exists a region of prices where, despite
the presence of career concerns, sincere trading can be supported in equilibrium. These results
are contained in Section 4.1.
Following this, we turn to the broader question of the relationship between the importance
of career concerns and the extent of information aggregation. For each possible price, we
de￿ne the most informative equilibrium strategies and provide a complete characterization
of how such strategies vary depending on the importance of career concerns. These results
are contained in Section 4.2.
While we have demonstrated our main impossibility result across the full spectrum of
potential perfect Bayesian equilibria, for our comparative statics results we focus only on
￿non-perverse￿equilibria with ￿t
1(ht) ￿ ￿t
0(ht) for all t and ht. These are the only reasonable
equilibria in a ￿nancial context. Other ￿perverse￿equilibria feature strictly negative bid-ask
spreads along the equilibrium path, which are very unrealistic in ￿nancial markets.12 As we
shall see shortly, a non-perverse equilibrium always exists.
4.1 Sincere Trading
In the absence of career concerns (when ￿ = 1), sincere trading, i.e., trading which com-
pletely reveals individual signals, is the unique equilibrium outcome of our game (Glosten
and Milgrom [16], Avery and Zemsky [4]). Our main result implies that in the presence of
career concerns (￿ < 1) sincere trading cannot be sustained at all possible prices. We now
consider whether, despite the presence of career concerns, sincere trading can be sustained
for some prices. We show that if the price is su¢ ciently close to 1
2, there always exists a
sincere equilibrium. Let ￿ = ￿￿g + (1 ￿ ￿)￿b.
Proposition 2 If pt 2 (1￿￿;￿), it is an equilibrium for all fund managers to trade sincerely.




The manager thinks that the high state is more likely if and only if he has a positive signal.
12A negative bid-ask spread would create an instantaneous risk-free arbitrage opportunity.This opportunity
cannot be exploited in a Glosten-Milgrom setup like ours because there are no agents who can buy and sell
at the same time. One could conceivably rule out perverse equilibria by adding uninformed short-lived arbi-
trageurs to the model. However, this would substantially complicate the model without generating additional
insights on information aggregation. In addition, such a modi￿cation would take us further away from the
well-known baseline model of sequential trade in the absence of career concerns, against which we currently
benchmark our results.
11It is easy to see that this implies that, if investors expect sincere play, a manager with a
positive signal should indeed buy and one with a negative signal should indeed sell.
4.2 How Career Concerns A⁄ect Information Aggregation
How does the ability of a market to aggregate information depend on the incentive structure
of its traders? In this section we show that the amount of information that is revealed in
equilibrium is decreasing in the strength of career concerns.
We begin our analysis by de￿ning the concept of the most informative equilibrium. For
any price pt, the most informative equilibrium is the equilibrium at time t where the di⁄erence
￿1￿￿0 is greatest. The following result is useful in characterizing most informative equilibria:







(i) There exists an equilibrium in which ￿1 ￿ ￿0 = 0 (1 = ￿1 ￿ ￿0).
(ii) If in equilibrium ￿1 > ￿0, then ￿0 = 0 (￿1 = 1):
This result, together with the symmetry of the game, implies that the most informative
equilibrium is determined by one variable ￿ ￿ 2 [0;1]. If pt ￿ 1
2, the most informative equilib-
rium is (￿0 = 0;￿1 = ￿ ￿). If pt > 1
2, the most informative equilibrium is (￿0 = 1 ￿ ￿ ￿;￿1 = 1).
Informativeness is increasing in ￿ ￿, with the two extreme values, zero and one, denoting
respectively a pooling equilibrium and a separating one.
Fix the parameters (￿;￿;￿g;￿b). For the remainder of this section restrict attention to
pt ￿ 1
2. All statements for pt > 1
2 are analogous.
We expect the most informative equilibrium to depend on the price and on the strength
of career concerns. Let us make this dependence explicit by using the notation ￿ ￿(￿;pt). In
addition, we slightly abuse notation by including ￿ and pt explicitly as arguments of ￿u1.
For pt ￿ 1





1 if ￿u1(￿1 = 1;￿0 = 0;pt;￿) ￿ 0
0 if ￿u1(￿1 = ￿;￿0 = 0;pt;￿) < 0; 8￿ > 0
maxf￿j￿u1(￿1 = ￿;￿0 = 0;pt;￿) = 0g otherwise
We can characterize how the most informative equilibrium varies as a function of ￿.























12For a given vector of parameters, the most informative equilibrium for price pt can be non-
informative, partially informative, or fully informative. A decrease in the strength of career
concerns (an increase in ￿) will weakly improve the informativeness of the most informative
equilibrium. If the equilibrium is partially informative, it will strictly improve it.
To obtain intuition for this result, consider a given pt ￿ 1
2 and let ￿ = ￿0. Since pro￿t
motivations always drive manager towards sincere trading (i.e., ￿￿1 > 0), if a manager
with st = 1 is exactly indi⁄erent between buying and selling (i.e., ￿u1 = 0) at a given pt,




< 1, it must be the case that buying
is reputationally costly for this manager (i.e., ￿r1 < 0). Now, increasing ￿ (say, to ￿00),
thus skewing incentives away from reputation, must make the manager strictly prefer to buy




can no longer be
the most informative equilibrium strategy at pt with ￿ = ￿00. There are two possibilities:




, or ￿u1 > 0 for









We can also derive monotone comparative statics on the relevant boundaries of the equi-
librium regions. Again, we restrict attention to p ￿ 1
2;(statements for p ￿ 1
2 are analogous)
and de￿ne:
pmin (￿) = supfpt : ￿ ￿(￿;pt) = 0g
pmax (￿) = inf fpt : ￿ ￿(￿;pt) = 1g
The ￿rst bound, pmin, is the highest price at which a non-informative equilibrium can be
sustained. The second, pmax, is the lowest price with a sincere equilibrium.13 We can now
state:













(ii) lim￿!1 pmax (￿) = lim￿!1 pmin (￿) = 0;
(iii) lim￿!0 pmax (￿) = lim￿!0 pmin (￿) = 1 ￿ ￿:
The intuition of this result builds directly on Proposition 4, which showed that at any given
pt increasing ￿ cannot decrease the amount of information revealed in the most informative
equilibrium. Thus, increasing ￿ can neither decrease the size of the sincere pricing region,
(pmax (￿); 1
2], nor increase the size of the conformist region, [0;pmin (￿)).
As career concerns vanish (point ii), play becomes sincere for all prices, which con￿rms
that Glosten and Milgrom [16] can be seen as a limit case of the present set-up. Point (iii)
states that, as career concerns become more important, play is sincere only if pt > 1 ￿ ￿,
which shows that the bound identi￿ed in Proposition 2 is tight.
13The other two conceivable bounds are uninteresting. The lowest price with a non-informative equilibrium
is always zero and the highest price (given that p ￿
1
2) with a sincere equilibrium is always
1
2.
134.3 Career Concerns and Financial Market Variables
One can study how the importance of career concerns a⁄ect other standard ￿nancial market
variables. In this section, we consider widely used measured of liquidity, volatility, and trade
predictability.
The bid-ask spread is the di⁄erence between the ask price and the bid price (pa
t ￿ pb
t),
and it is a commonly used measure of market illiquidity. Price volatility can be de￿ned as
variance of the price of the asset at time t + 1 given the price at t: V ar[pt+1jpt]. Finally,
trade-predictability is the ability to predict the sign of the trade at time t based on public
information. We measure it by 1
V ar(atjpt).
We show that each of these variables is monotonically related to the importance of career
concerns:
Proposition 6 For any given p, in the most informative equilibrium, the bid-ask spread and
price volatility are non-decreasing, and trade predictability is non-increasing, in ￿.
Increasing ￿ weakens career concerns. Thus, stronger career concerns make markets more
liquid and less volatile, and makes trades more predictable. In sequential trade models with
risk-neutral and competitive market makers, the bid-ask spread, and thus illiquidity, arises
out of adverse selection. The more the informed traders (fund managers) utilize their private
information in their trades, therefore, the higher the bid-ask spread, and thus the greater the
amount of information revealed in equilibrium. Proposition 4 shows that the higher is ￿ (i.e.,
the less important are career concerns) the more informative the trades of fund managers.
Thus, increasing ￿ increases the bid-ask spread. For the same informational reason, career
concerns also make market prices and trades more predictable. As less information is revealed,
the price is more stable.
The results of sections 4.2 and 4.3 provide theoretical underpinning to a number of ex-
isting empirical ￿ndings, and also suggest new avenues for empirical work. We discuss the
connection to the empirical literature in the conclusion.
5 Extensions
5.1 A More General Set-Up
The baseline model was presented for a simple binary structure where liquidation values could
take only two possible values. We extend it here to a generic discrete set of possible values
V 2 <. Denote the maximum and minimum possible values of v 2 V by vmax and vmin. The
ex ante distribution of v is determined by any arbitrary probability mass function.
14Each fund manager of type ￿ 2 fb;gg (with Pr(￿ = g) = ￿ as before) receives a signal
distributed according to Pr(s = 1jv;￿) = ￿v;￿, with the following properties:
A1 Full support: ￿v;￿ 2 (0;1) for all ￿ and v.








A3 Informativeness: ￿v;￿ increasing in v for all ￿, and ￿vmax;g > ￿vmax;b and ￿vmin;g < ￿vmin;b.
The ￿rst assumption (A1) is crucial. It implies that the signal is never fully informative:
for all s and v: Pr(vjs) < 1. If a manager knows he has the truth, he would follow his signal
even if all his predecessors had traded in the opposite direction.
First, note that if there are no career concerns (￿ = 1) there exists a fully informative
equilibrium (see Avery and Zemsky [4]). When, instead, career concerns are present, we shall
see that full information revelation is impossible.
Proposition 7 For ￿ < 1, there exists no equilibrium for which limt!1 pt = v for more
than one liquidation value v.
The intuition parallels the case with binary liquidation values, and we therefore provide
only a concise summary here. Assumptions A2 and A3 guarantee that for all but possibly
one liquidation value, either ￿v;g > ￿v;b or ￿v;g < ￿v;b. For each such v we show that there
cannot exist informative equilibria when p is close enough to v. Consider the possibility that
there is an informative equilibrium with ￿1 > ￿0. As p ! v, pro￿ts become unimportant,
and the manager ￿nds it desirable to indicate via her action that she has received a particular
reputation-enhancing signal. If, for example, v is such that ￿v;g < ￿v;b it is better for the
manager to sell, which indicates that she was likely to have received signal 0. But since
this is true even for a manager with s = 1, we must have ￿1 = 0, and thus the equilibrium
cannot be informative. Alternatively, consider the possibility that there is an informative
equilibrium with ￿1 < ￿0. Then, as we have argued earlier in the main model, the manager
with s = 1 must always prefer to sell from a reputational perspective: ￿r1 < 0. Suppose
again that p ! v where ￿v;g < ￿v;b. Then, the manager must ￿nd it reputationally bene￿cial
to indicate that she has received s = 0, but can only do this (since ￿1 < ￿0) by buying, which
contradicts the fact that ￿r1 < 0. Thus for p close enough to v there cannot be informative
equilibria with ￿1 < ￿0.
155.2 Self-Knowledge
The baseline analysis was carried out under the assumption that the manager did not know
his type. What happens if the fund managers have some self-knowledge? In this section we
examine the extent to which our results extend to such more complex settings. In doing so
we illustrate the nature of interaction between conformism and self-knowledge, and show that
the central economic message of our baseline model is robust to the presence of substantial
self-knowledge.
We now let each fund manager receive two signals: the now familiar st; and a new signal










Note that the right-hand side of the inequality varies between 1
2 (when ￿g = ￿b) to 2
3 (when
￿g = 1 and ￿b = 1
2). This assumption can be given a very natural economic interpretation. It
is straightforward to show that condition (1) is equivalent to assuming that Pr(￿ = gjs = v) >
Pr(￿ = gjz = g). Thus, this condition guarantees that the manager￿ s reputation is more
sensitive to the precision of his signal about the asset payo⁄ than to his signal about his own
type.
Denote by ￿sz the probability with which a manager who has received liquidation value
signal s and self knowledge signal z chooses to buy. It is easy to see that, in the absence of
career concerns (￿ = 1) ￿and provided that the proportion of noise traders is su¢ ciently high
￿the game has a unique equilibrium: ￿1g = ￿1b = 1 and ￿0b = ￿0g = 0. This equilibrium
has the property that trades fully reveal the liquidation value signal s. We demonstrate that,
for su¢ ciently extreme prices, no such equilibrium can exist when ￿ < 1. We also rule out
the possibility of the existence of an informationally equivalent ￿perverse￿equilibrium with
￿1g = ￿1b = 0 and ￿0b = ￿0g = 1. We show that:
Proposition 8 If condition (1) is satis￿ed, there exists a threshold ￿ p 2 (0;1), such that if
p < ￿ p or p > 1￿ ￿ p; there is neither an equilibrium with ￿1g = ￿1b = 1 and ￿0b = ￿0g = 0 nor
an equilibrium with ￿1g = ￿1b = 0 and ￿0b = ￿0g = 1.14
The intuition behind this result clari￿es the interaction between conformism and self-
knowledge. A manager can signal the quality of his type either by making the (ex post)
14The proof in the appendix shows that, for su¢ ciently extreme prices, not only is there no equilibrium
with ￿1g = ￿1b = 1 and ￿0b = ￿0g = 0 but there is actually no equilibrium with ￿1g ￿ ￿1b ￿ ￿0b ￿ ￿0g
where at least one inequality is strict. However, no such generalization is available for the second part of the
proposition.
16correct trade or by taking an action that reveals that he received a positive signal about
his own type. For a given history, these two actions may not be identical. As long as the
parameters of the model are such that the manager￿ s reputation is helped more by revealing
that he received the ex post correct signal about asset payo⁄s rather than by revealing that
he received a good signal about his type, our baseline results go through. A manager with a
good type-signal and a ￿contrarian￿value-signal does not then ￿nd it worthwhile to try to
reveal his type-signal at the risk of taking the incorrect contrarian action. Thus, just as in
the baseline case, it becomes optimal for him to behave in a conformist manner.
Propositions 8 implies that allowing for career concerns ￿slows down￿the rate of infor-
mation aggregation via prices compared to the case with no career concerns: it is no longer
possible that the trades of fund managers will reveal their signals in each period once prices
are su¢ ciently extreme. It is worth noting that this result is weaker than the impossibility
result in Proposition 1. While there we were able to prove the necessity of a full informational
cascade, here we can only exclude a certain class of informative equilibria.15
5.3 Other Extensions
It is possible to extend our model in a variety of other directions. As we have noted earlier,
our qualitative results go through for a much richer class of payo⁄ functions:
ut = ￿￿(￿t) + (1 ￿ ￿)R(rt)
where ￿ and R are increasing and piecewise continuous functions. The extension to such
payo⁄ functions increases algebraic complexity without adding to the intuition behind our
results.
In addition, instead of having managers derive utility from their absolute reputation, we
could allow them to care about reputation relative to their peers. For example, we could
rede￿ne manager t￿ s reputational payo⁄ by Rt(r1;:::;rT), where ri represents the realized
reputation of manager i, with @Rt
@rt > 0 and @Rt
@r￿ < 0 for ￿ 6= t. Even in this more complex
case, it is possible to show that sincere trading cannot be sustained as an equilibrium. To see
why, imagine that we are in an equilibrium with sincere trade, and consider the incentives
of the last manager. Since this manager￿ s actions cannot a⁄ect the principal￿ s beliefs about
his peers, he is just like a manager in our baseline model. He will conform for su¢ ciently
extreme prices.
It is also possible to consider introducing informed non-career concerned (individual)
traders into our model. Informed individuals devoid of career concerns would trade sincerely,
15There remains the possibility that, in the self-knowledge case, full-information revelation is achieved in
the long term through less informative equilibria. While we cannot exclude that possibility, we were unable
to construct examples in which this occurred.
17and thus, in the presence of such traders, prices would eventually converge to true value.
However, the basic intuition of the main result remains unchanged: once prices were close
enough to true value, career concerned institutional traders would begin to ignore their own
information. Thus convergence to true value would take place much more slowly than in the
case without fund managers, and the extent of slowdown in convergence would depend on
the proportion of career concerned traders in the market. In addition, conformist trading
by institutional traders would still occur in the presence of informed individual traders, in
keeping with empirical ￿ndings (e.g. Sias [25]).
Finally, it is possible to micro-found the utility function assumed in this paper. This, and
the other extensions alluded to in this subsection, are discussed in greater detail in Dasgupta
and Prat [12].
6 Conclusion
The central message of this paper is that we should expect the presence of traders with
reputational concerns to a⁄ect the dynamic properties of ￿nancial markets. In particular, we
have shown that stronger career concerns necessarily lead to more conformist behavior among
traders, less precise information aggregation through prices, and better market liquidity. This
paper creates a link between two sets of variables: the incentive structure faced by traders
and the dynamics of asset markets. As both sets of variables are potentially measurable, our
comparative statics results lead to clear-cut testable predictions.
In particular, our analysis provides theoretical underpinnings for a number of empirical
￿ndings. First, in all equilibria of our game, institutional investors exhibit conformist trading
at some prices. Such conformism introduces high serial correlation in institutional trade.
This prediction provides a theoretical rationale for the results of Sias [25]. Sias examines the
quarterly SEC 13-F reports of US institutional money managers from 1983 to 1997 and ￿nds
a strong positive relationship between the fraction of institutions buying individual stocks
over adjacent quarters, consistent with money managers herding behind each other￿ s trades.16
In addition, our results indicate the extent of institutional conformism (e.g., measured by the
informativeness of their trading strategies or by the range of prices over which they herd)
is linked to the incentive structure of their traders. This prediction ￿nds indirect support
16This ￿nding is complemented by Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo [13] who examine SEC 13-F reports from
1983 to 2003 and ￿nd (amongst other things) that a vast majority of institutional traders exhibit conformist
trading patterns. They excessively buy (sell) stocks that have been persistently bought (sold) by their peers
consecutively over a period of 5 or more quarters. See also Dennis and Strickland [14]. Sias [26] provides a
recent survey and reconciliation of the growing literature on momentum trading and herding by institutional
traders.
18in the work of Massa and Patgiri [19]. Massa and Patgiri study data on US mutual funds
for the period 1994-2003, and quantify the extent of pro￿t-based incentives in the contracts
of fund managers. They ￿nd that those managers who receive higher pro￿t-based incentives
(i.e., have higher ￿ in our setting) exhibit less conformism. Finally, some of our predictions
point to potentially interesting new empirical exercises. For example, it would be interesting
to examine whether there is a relationship between the incentives of money managers and
the liquidity and volatility of the stocks they trade. Our stylized model predicts that, ceteris
paribus, career concerned fund managers will increase liquidity and reduce volatility of the
assets they trade.
Our model is stylized. We believe that it is important to build richer and more realistic
models of dynamic ￿nancial markets with career concerned traders. The increasing impor-
tance of professional money managers in ￿nancial markets make such extensions topical. Our
results establish a benchmark against which such future ￿ndings can be understood.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
We ￿rst characterize some crucial properties of beliefs in our model:
Lemma 1 Let vt
st = Pr(v = 1jht;st). Then,
(a) vt
st is strictly increasing and continuous in pt;
(b) vt
st = 1(0) if pt = 1(0);
(c) vt
1 > vt




pt Pr(stjv = 1)
pt Pr(stjv = 1) + (1 ￿ pt)Pr(stjv = 0)









pt + (1 ￿ pt)1￿￿
￿




pt + (1 ￿ pt) ￿
1￿￿
Since ￿g > ￿b > 1
2, ￿ > 1
2. Thus 1￿￿
￿ < 1 < ￿
1￿￿. This then implies vt
1 > vt
0 which completes
the proof of the lemma.
19Given that the action set of every manager is binary, it is easy to see that the game has
at least one PBE. Focus on time t. Suppose that given history ht (with price pt), equilibrium
play dictates strategy ￿t
0 (ht) and ￿t
1 (ht).
The strategy of the proof is as follows. There are three cases: ￿t




1 (ht), and ￿t
0 (ht) = ￿t
1 (ht). We shall identify a lower bound and an upper bound to price
such that the ￿rst two cases are impossible if the price is above the upper bound or below
the lower bound. As it will become apparent, those two bounds are independent of time and
history. The third case denotes uninformative play on the part of the manager at time t.
Note that, if at a certain time t the price goes above the upper bound or below the lower
bound, uninformative play guarantees that the price will not change in the next round; hence,
play will be uninformative from then on.
In the remainder of the proof, we hold history and time constant. For simplicity, therefore,
we drop the history and time arguments (e.g. ￿t
0 (ht) become ￿0).




2 + (1 ￿ ￿)[￿1￿ + ￿0(1 ￿ ￿)]
￿ 1




2 + (1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿1)￿ + (1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿)]
￿ 1
2 + (1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿1)￿t + (1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿t)]
p;
where ￿ = ￿￿g + (1 ￿ ￿)￿b, and ￿ = p￿ + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿).
The manager￿ s equilibrium strategy fully determines investors￿beliefs (the beliefs do not
depend on history or price directly ￿they only depend on history and price through ￿1 and
￿0):17
r(a = 1;v = 1) =
￿1￿g + ￿0 (1 ￿ ￿g)
￿1￿ + ￿0 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
r(a = 1;v = 0) =
￿1 (1 ￿ ￿g) + ￿0￿g
￿1 (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿0￿
￿
r(a = 0;v = 1) =
(1 ￿ ￿1)￿g + (1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿g)
(1 ￿ ￿1)￿ + (1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
r(a = 0;v = 0) =
(1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿g) + (1 ￿ ￿0)￿g
(1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿0)￿
￿
Suppose the manager observes signal s = 1. The di⁄erence in his expected payo⁄ if he plays
a = 1 instead of a = 0 can be denoted with
￿u1 = ￿￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿r1;
17This key property of beliefs in our game is due to the assumption that investors observe the liquidation
value v and that the managers￿signals are mutually independent given v.
20where the pro￿t component is
￿￿1 = (v1 ￿ pa) ￿ (pb ￿ v1)
and the reputational component is
￿r1 = v1 (r(a = 1;v = 1) ￿ r(a = 0;v = 1)) + (1 ￿ v1)(r(a = 1;v = 0) ￿ r(a = 0;v = 0))
Case with ￿0 < ￿1 :
Suppose ￿rst that ￿0 < ￿1. We ￿rst show that in all equilibria either the manager with
the high signal or the manager with the low signal play a pure strategy.
Lemma 2 There are no mixed strategy equilibria in which 0 < ￿0 < ￿1 < 1 for any t.
Proof. Consider a putative equilibrium in which 1 > ￿0 > 0, i.e. the agent at time t
who receives signal zero is exactly indi⁄erent between buying and selling. We will show that
in this equilibrium, it must be the case that the agent who receives signal 1 at time t must
strictly prefer to buy rather than sell. Consider the expected pro￿t di⁄erence between buying
and selling: ￿￿s. This can be written as
vs ((1 ￿ pa) ￿ (pb ￿ 1)) + (1 ￿ vs)((0 ￿ pa) ￿ (pb ￿ 0))
Since (1 ￿ pa) ￿ (pb ￿ 1) > 0 > (0 ￿ pa) ￿ (pb ￿ 0), and by Lemma 1 v1 > v0, it is clear that
￿￿1 > ￿￿0.
Now consider the expected reputational payo⁄ di⁄erence between buying and selling:
￿rst. This can be expressed as:
vs[r(a = 1;v = 1) ￿ r(a = 0;v = 1)] + (1 ￿ vs)[r(a = 1;v = 0) ￿ r(a = 0;v = 0)]
Notice that r(a = 1;v = 1) > r(a = 0;v = 1). To see why note that
￿1￿g + ￿0 (1 ￿ ￿g)
￿1￿ + ￿0 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿1)￿g + (1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿g)
(1 ￿ ￿1)￿ + (1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿)
) (￿g ￿ ￿)(￿1 ￿ ￿0) < 0
which is a contradiction since ￿g ￿ ￿ > 0 and ￿1 ￿ ￿0 > 0. A similar argument establishes
that r(a = 1;v = 0) < r(a = 0;v = 0). Thus,
r(a = 1;v = 1) ￿ r(a = 0;v = 1) > 0 > r(a = 1;v = 0) ￿ r(a = 0;v = 0):
Given Lemma 1, we know that v1 > v0, and thus ￿r1 > ￿r0.
Putting these together, we have ￿u1 > ￿u0 = 0. Thus, if 0 < ￿0 < 1, then ￿1 = 1. An
identical argument establishes that if 0 < ￿1 < 1, then ￿0 = 0.
21At a given price p, consider ￿￿s, the pro￿t incentives of an agent who has received s to
buy vs sell:
2vs(p) ￿ pa(p) ￿ pb(p)
Since pa ￿ 0 and pb ￿ 0, and v0(p) < v1(p) = ￿






At the same price p consider ￿rs the reputational incentives of this agent to buy vs sell:
vs
￿
￿1￿g + ￿0 (1 ￿ ￿g)
￿1￿ + ￿0 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿1)￿g + (1 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿g)





￿1 (1 ￿ ￿g) + ￿0￿g
￿1 (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿0￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿g) + (1 ￿ ￿0)￿g
(1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿0)￿
￿
￿
Lemma 2 allows us to restrict attention to cases where either ￿1 = 1 > ￿0 ￿ 0 or 1 ￿ ￿1 >





































Thus, an upper bound on the expected utility di⁄erence enjoyed by this agent from buying































This is linear and increasing in ￿
￿p = v1(p), which in turn, is increasing in p. It crosses 0


















Since v1(p) > 0 if and only if p > 0, we know that b p1 > 0. Thus we have proved that if
p < b p1 managers will sell regardless of their signals. A symmetric proof establishes that for
p > 1 ￿ b p1 managers will buy regardless of their signals. Thus, for p < b p1 and p > 1 ￿ b p1 it
cannot be the case that ￿1 > ￿0.
Case with ￿0 > ￿1 :
We now move on to the case where ￿0 > ￿1. As before, we de￿ne
￿u1 = ￿￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿r1
22If ￿0 > ￿1, a manager who observes s = 1 plays a = 0 with positive probability. It must be
that ￿u1 ￿ 0. As ￿￿1 > 0, a necessary condition for the existence of such an equilibrium is
that ￿r1 < 0. We shall show that this condition cannot hold if p is su¢ ciently low.
As before,
￿r1 = v1 (r(a = 1;v = 1) ￿ r(a = 0;v = 1)) + (1 ￿ v1)(r(a = 1;v = 0) ￿ r(a = 0;v = 0))




r(a = 1;v = 0) ￿ r(a = 0;v = 0)
r(a = 1;v = 1) ￿ r(a = 0;v = 1)
Let
a = ￿1￿g + ￿0 (1 ￿ ￿g) A = ￿1￿ + ￿0 (1 ￿ ￿)


























B (1 ￿ B)
=
￿(￿1 ￿ ￿0)(￿g ￿ ￿)
B (1 ￿ B)





B (1 ￿ B)
￿ K (2)
We are interested in the lower bound inf￿1<￿0 K. If it is strictly greater than zero, then for
p low enough the necessary condition (2) cannot be satis￿ed.
Lemma 3 inf￿1<￿0 K = 1￿￿
￿ :
Proof. First, assume that the in￿mum is reached at an interior point: 0 < ￿1 < ￿0 < 1.









B (1 ￿ B)
= 0
These can be expressed as
￿ (1 ￿ 2A)B (1 ￿ B) = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ 2B)A(1 ￿ A)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ 2A)B (1 ￿ B) = ￿ (1 ￿ 2B)A(1 ￿ A)
23Since ￿
1￿￿ > 1￿￿
￿ and A;B 2 (0;1), the only way these two hold together is if A = B = 1
2
which is impossible since ￿1 6= ￿0.
Consider instead the corner solution: 0 = ￿1 < ￿0 ￿ 1. Now A = ￿0 (1 ￿ ￿) and
B = ￿0￿. Thus,
K =
￿0 (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿0 (1 ￿ ￿))




1 ￿ ￿0 (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿0￿
Since ￿ > 1












The other potential corner solution is obtained by: 0 ￿ ￿1 < ￿0 = 1. Now A = ￿1￿ + 1 ￿ ￿




(￿1￿ + 1 ￿ ￿)
(￿1 (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿)
which is minimized for ￿1 ! 0, with value 1. Hence, the in￿mum is 1￿￿
￿ .
Thus, there exists b p2 > 0 such that for p < b p2 the necessary condition for ￿0 > ￿1 fails. A
corresponding upper bound of 1 ￿ b p2 follows from a symmetric proof. Thus, we have shown
that for p < b p2 and p > 1 ￿ b p2 it is not possible to have ￿0 > ￿1.
Price bounds:
We have now shown that there exists b p1 > 0 and b p2 > 0 such that for p = 2 [b p1;1￿ b p1] it is
not possible to have ￿1 > ￿0 and for p = 2 [b p2;1 ￿ b p2] it is not possible to have ￿1 < ￿0. Now
de￿ne b p = min(b p1; b p2). Thus for p = 2 [b p;1 ￿ b p] it is not possible to have ￿1 6= ￿0.
In order to compute the lowest possible transaction price that can potentially be reached,
we compute the bid-price at b p under the assumption that play is sincere and that there are
no noise traders. This is given by
p ￿ Pr[v = 1jb p;s = 0] =
(1 ￿ ￿)b p
￿(1 ￿ b p) + (1 ￿ ￿)b p
A price below p can never be reached, because it would imply an informative trade following
a transaction price (public belief) of p = b p or lower. An upper bound on prices of 1 ￿ p
follows by symmetry. Note that for ￿ > 0 (i.e., with noise traders) transaction prices of p and




. This completes the proof of
the ￿rst part of the proposition.
Second part of the proposition:








24It is easy to see that in this situation, since ￿ ! 1
2, limp = 1
3 as well. By continuity (of
￿u over all the parameters of the game as well as p), one sees that for any p < 1
3 there is
a set of parameter values with positive measure such that for prices below p there are no
non-perverse equilibria in all games with parameters in that set.
For the case where ￿1 < ￿0, we ￿nd the maximal value of 1￿￿
￿ , which is attained under
the same limiting values used for the case with ￿1 > ￿0. Note that v1
1￿v1 > 1￿￿
￿ if and only
if v1 > 1 ￿ ￿. lim￿g!1;￿b!1
2;￿!0 ￿ = min￿ = 1
2. In this limit, there is no equilibrium with
￿1 < ￿0 if v1 ￿ 1
2. Given that ￿ ! 1
2, v1 ! p. This shows that lim￿g!1;￿b!1
2;￿!0 b p2 = 1
2.
This would yield a boundary p = 1
2.
Comparing the perverse and the non-perverse case, we see that the lower boundary is
p = 1
3. This completes the proof of the second part of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2:
To prove this proposition, we need to show that for pt 2 (1 ￿ ￿;￿) ￿t
0 = 0 and ￿t
1 = 1 is an
equilibrium. For the fund manager with st = 1, the expected pro￿t di⁄erence from buying









0 = 0 and ￿t
1 = 1,





































2 if and only if
pt ￿ 1 ￿ ￿. Thus, for pt ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ the manager with st = 1 would prefer to buy from both
pro￿t and reputational perspectives.
Now consider the case of a manager with st = 0. This manager pro￿t di⁄erence from









0 = 0 and ￿t
1 = 1, then the reputational





































2 if and only if
pt ￿ ￿. Since ￿ > 1
2, 1 ￿ ￿ < ￿, and thus for a strictly positive measure region (1 ￿ ￿;￿)
sincere play is an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3:
We provide the proof for the case where pt ￿ 1
2. The other case is symmetric.
To prove (i), assume that ￿0 = 0. It is easy to check that, for all values of ￿1 > 0,
￿￿0(￿1;￿0 = 0) ￿ 0 and ￿r0(￿1;￿0 = 0) ￿ 0:
The ￿rst is immediate. For the second, ￿rst note that it is easy to check that ￿r0(￿1;￿0 = 0)
is increasing in p: At p = 1
2, v0 (p) = 1 ￿ ￿, and thus for ￿ > 0:





(1 ￿ ￿)￿g + 1 ￿ ￿g







(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿g) + ￿g




(￿g ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))](2￿ ￿ 1)￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
< 0
So, if ￿1 > 0, we know that ￿u0(￿1;￿0 = 0) ￿ 0 and ￿0 = 0 is a best response. Consider
two cases: (a) lim￿1!0+ ￿u1(￿1;￿0 = 0) ￿ 0 and (b) lim￿1!0+ ￿u1(￿1;￿0 = 0) < 0.
In case (a), by continuity of ￿u1, either ￿u1(￿1 = 1;￿0 = 0) ￿ 0 or there exists an
interior ￿1 such that ￿u1 = 0. Either subcase corresponds to an equilibrium.
In case (b), there exists a pooling equilibrium where ￿1 = ￿0 = 0. To see this, it is
su¢ cient to set the beliefs generated by the out-of-equilibrium action a = 1 as if this action
comes from someone with s = 1. In this case, one can easily see that
￿u1(￿1 = 0;￿0 = 0) = lim
￿1!0+ ￿u1(￿1;￿0 = 0);
which, as we are in case (b), must be negative.
For part (ii), consider an equilibrium with ￿1 > ￿0, and consider the manager who has
received signal s = 0. It is clear at this point that ￿￿0 < 0 for all p. We now show that for
p ￿ 1






Suppose for contradiction that ￿0 = ￿ > 0. Lemma 2 and the assumption that ￿1 > ￿0
imply that ￿0 = 1. Let p = 1







= (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿g + ￿(1 ￿ ￿g)







1 ￿ ￿g + ￿￿g







(￿g ￿ ￿)(2￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)
[￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)][1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿]
￿ < 0;
26which generates a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Since we are considering p ￿ 1
2 where by Proposition 3 we know that ￿0 = 0, we suppress ￿0
in the proof. We thus write ￿u(￿1;p;￿) for ￿u(￿1;￿0 = 0;p;￿), and similarly for ￿￿ and
￿r. It is easy to check that the function ￿u(￿;p;￿) is continuous in ￿ (for ￿ > 0).












We know that ￿￿ > 0 for all values. If ￿r
￿
1;p;￿0￿
















In both cases, ￿u
￿
1;p;￿00￿





























































As ￿u(￿;p;￿) is continuous in ￿, at least one of the following statements must be true:















= 0 (in which case there
exists an informative equilibrium with ￿ = ￿00); or (ii) ￿u
￿
1;p;￿00￿
￿ 0 (in which case there









Proof of Proposition 5:
Start with (i). If b p 2 fpt : ￿ ￿(￿;pt) = 0g then by de￿nition ￿u1(0; b p;￿) ￿ 0 and ￿u1(￿; b p;￿) <
0 for all ￿ 2 (0;1]. Hence, pmin (￿) must satisfy the following two conditions: ￿u1(0;pmin (￿);￿) ￿
0 and ￿u1(￿;pmin (￿);￿) ￿ 0 for all ￿ 2 (0;1]. Thus, ￿u1(￿;pmin (￿);￿) ￿ 0 for all
￿ 2 [0;1].
Let ￿ = ￿00. ￿u1(￿;pmin
￿
￿00￿
;￿00) ￿ 0 for all ￿ 2 [0;1]. Consider ￿0 < ￿00. Since
￿￿1 > 0 and ￿r1 < 0, ￿u1(￿;pmin
￿
￿00￿











27If b p 2 fpt : ￿ ￿(￿;pt) = 1g then by de￿nition ￿u1(1; b p;￿) ￿ 0. Hence, pmax (￿) must
satisfy ￿u1(1;pmax (￿);￿) = 0. Let ￿ = ￿0. Since ￿u1 is continuous in p and we know




which implies that ￿￿1(1;pmax
￿
￿0￿
) > 0 and ￿r1(1;pmax
￿
￿0￿
) < 0. Consider ￿00 > ￿0. It is
now clear that ￿u1(1;pmax
￿
￿0￿



















For (ii), simply note that for all ￿ and p > 0
lim
￿!1
￿u1 (￿;p;￿) = ￿￿1 (￿;p) > 0
Hence, for all p > 0,
lim
￿!1
￿ ￿(￿;p) = 1;
which shows that lim￿!1 pmax (￿) = lim￿!1 pmin (￿) = 0:
For (iii), ￿rst we show that lim￿!0 pmax (￿) = 1 ￿ ￿. Note that
lim
￿!1




















￿p+(1￿￿)(1￿p). It is easy to see that ￿r1 (1;p) ￿ 0 if and only if p ￿ 1 ￿ ￿.
Now consider lim￿!0 pmin (￿). For any ￿, lim￿!1 ￿u1 (￿;p;￿) = ￿r1 (￿;p), where





(1 ￿ ￿)￿g + 1 ￿ ￿g







(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿g) + ￿g
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
￿
￿
We wish to ￿nd p such that ￿r1 (￿;p) < 0 for all ￿ > 0 and ￿r1 (0;p) ￿ 0. We observe
that ￿r1 (￿;p) is strictly increasing in p. Thus, for any ￿ there exists a p(￿) such that
￿r1 (￿;p) < 0 if p < p(￿). We compute p(￿) for all ￿ and minimize with respect to ￿. This
gives lim￿!0 pmin (￿).












Since v1(p) is increasing in p, we minimize v1(p(￿)) with respect to ￿, which is equivalent to
















1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿￿
The maximand is monotone increasing in ￿ since ￿ > 1
2, and thus
min




￿ p(￿) = p(1) = 1 ￿ ￿
Thus, lim￿!0 pmin (￿) = 1 ￿ ￿.
Proof of Proposition 6:





. Recall that in the most informative equilibrium a
manager with st = 0 sells and a manager with st = 1 buys with probability ￿ ￿(￿;p). The ask




2 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿
￿ 1





2 + (1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿ ￿)￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)]
￿ 1
2 + (1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿ ￿)￿t + (1 ￿ ￿t)]
pt;
It is easy to check that the former is increasing in ￿ ￿, which, by Proposition 4, is non-decreasing
in ￿.
Price-volatility. Given pt, the random variable pt+1takes two values: pa
t with probability
￿ = ￿ 1
2 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿t and pb
t with probability 1 ￿ ￿ = ￿ 1
2 + (1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿ ￿)￿t + (1 ￿ ￿t)].
The variance is
V ar[pt+1jpt] = ￿(pa
t ￿ pt)

















t (1 ￿ ￿)
2 (￿ ￿ ￿t)
2 ￿ ￿2
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
It is then easy to check that V ar[pt+1jpt] is increasing ￿ ￿, and hence non-decreasing in ￿.
Trade-predictability. This is immediate because
V ar(atjpt) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
and (for p < 1
2) ￿ is increasing in ￿ ￿. Thus, trade predictability, 1
V ar(atjpt), is decreasing in ￿ ￿,
and thus non-increasing in ￿.
Proof of Proposition 7:
29Note that there is at most one v for which ￿v;g = ￿v;b. Denote this by vequal, so that for
v < vequal; ￿v;g < ￿v;b and for v > vequal; ￿v;g > ￿v;b. Consider any arbitrary (true) liqui-
dation value v￿ < vequal (the case for v￿ > vequal is symmetric and is omitted). Suppose for
contradiction that the equilibrium is such that limt!1 pt = v￿. Namely, for every Pr[v￿jht],
there must be an informative equilibrium with either ￿1 > ￿0 or ￿0 > ￿1.
Case with ￿1 > ￿0
First note that, reusing the notation of the baseline model, ￿￿1 > 0 > ￿￿0. In addition,
for v￿ < vequal and ￿1 > ￿0 it is easy to show that r(v￿;1) ￿ r(v￿;0) < 0. Thus, since
￿￿0 < 0, r(v￿;1)￿r(v￿;0) < 0; and r(v;1)￿r(v;0) is bounded for all v, there exists an ￿ > 0
such that for Pr(v = v￿jpt) > 1 ￿ ￿, ￿u0 < 0 and thus ￿0 = 0.18 Now for histories implying
that Pr(v = v￿jpt) > 1 ￿ ￿, we can set ￿0 = 0, and write:





￿v￿;g(1 ￿ ￿1) + 1 ￿ ￿v￿;g
￿v￿ (1 ￿ ￿1) + 1 ￿ ￿v￿
￿
￿
where ￿v￿ = ￿￿v￿;g + (1 ￿ ￿)￿v￿;b > ￿v￿;g. It follows that we can ￿nd a strictly negative




￿v￿;g(1 ￿ ￿1) + 1 ￿ ￿v￿;g




￿ 1 < 0
Now, consider the agent with s = 1. Given the boundedness of ￿￿1 and r(v;1) ￿ r(v;0) for
all v, we can write:
lim
Pr(v=v￿jpt)!1







Thus, ￿1 = 0, and for Pr(v = v￿jpt) high enough, the equilibrium cannot be informative.
Case with ￿1 < ￿0
In order to have an informative equilibrium, it must be the case that ￿u1 ￿ 0 and since
￿￿1 > 0 it must be the case that ￿r1 < 0. That is
X
v
Pr[vjht;s = 1](r(v;1) ￿ r(v;0)) < 0:
Thus,
Pr[v = v￿jht;s = 1](r(v￿;1) ￿ r(v￿;0)) <
X
v6=v￿
Pr[vjht;s = 1](r(v;0) ￿ r(v;1))
It is clear that for any ￿1 < ￿0; r(v;1) ￿ r(v;0) > 0 if and only if ￿v;g < ￿v;b. In particular,
for any ￿1 < ￿0 the maximum value of r(v;0) ￿ r(v;1) is attained at v = vmax. This is
18Note that, as in the baseline model, we can rule out totally mixed equilibria with ￿1 > ￿0.
30because, for any given ￿1 < ￿0, r(v;0) is increasing in v and r(v;1) is decreasing in v. To
see that (we omit the r(v;0) case), note that
r(v;1) =
￿v;g￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿v;g)￿0
￿v￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿v)￿0
;
where, as before, ￿v = ￿￿v;g + (1 ￿ ￿)￿v;b. By A2, the ratio
￿v;g
￿v is increasing in v and
the ratio
1￿￿v;g
1￿￿v is decreaing in v. As ￿0 > ￿1, this implies that the whole ratio r(v;1) is
decreasing in v.




Pr[vjht;s = 1](r(vmax;0) ￿ r(vmax;1)). Hence, a necessary condition for ￿r1 < 0 at
v = v￿ is
Pr[v = v￿jht;s = 1](r(v￿;1) ￿ r(v￿;0)) < (1 ￿ Pr[v = v￿jht;s = 1])(r(vmax;0) ￿ r(vmax;1))




1 ￿ Pr[v = v￿jht;s = 1]





We shall show that inf￿1<￿0 E > 0, which means that for histories implying Pr[v = v￿jht;s = 1]
high enough, the necessary condition must fail. The proof is a convoluted version of the rel-
evant subcase of the proof of the main result. De￿ne
b = ￿v￿;g￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿v￿;g)￿0 B = ￿v￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿v￿)￿0
a = ￿vmax;g￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿vmax;g)￿0 A = ￿vmax￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿vmax)￿0














As before, interior solutions are ruled out by the facts that ￿vmax > ￿v￿ and A 6= B. The
remaining possibilities are that ￿1 = 0 and ￿0 > 0, in which case the in￿mum can be shown
to be
1￿￿vmax





31Proof of Proposition 8:
We ￿rst show that for su¢ ciently extreme prices, there cannot be any equilibrium in which
￿1g ￿ ￿1b ￿ ￿0b ￿ ￿0g with at least one strict inequality. This implies the ￿rst part of the
proposition.
First note that because ￿g > ￿b ￿ 1





condition (1) also guarantees that ￿ <
1￿￿b
2￿￿g￿￿b which can be shown to be equivalent to
Pr(￿ = gjs 6= v) < Pr(￿ = gjz = b).
There are now four types of managers, determined by the values of s and z. Accordingly,
any equilibrium, given p, is fully described by the probabilities that the four types play a = 1,
which we denote as ￿0g, ￿1g, ￿0b, and ￿1b (where, for instance, ￿0b = Pr(a = 1js = 0;z = b)).
First, note that￿￿sz = 2vsz ￿ pa ￿ pb; where vsg = Pr[v = 1js;z]. This implies a strict
ordering: ￿￿1g > ￿￿1b > ￿￿0b > ￿￿0g:
Next, note that the reputational bene￿t is
￿rsz = vsz (r(a = 1;v = 1) ￿ r(a = 0;v = 1))+(1 ￿ vsz)(r(a = 1;v = 0) ￿ r(a = 0;v = 0))
As the equilibrium is non-perverse and informative, ￿0z ￿ ￿1z0 for z 2 fb;gg and z0 2 fb;gg
with at least one strict inequality. We show that, under condition 1, this implies:
r(a = 1;v = 1) > r(a = 0;v = 1) and r(a = 1;v = 0) < r(a = 0;v = 0)
We show that r(a = 1;v = 1) > ￿. This automatically implies that r(a = 0;v = 1) < ￿.







Suppose that r(a = 1;v = 1) ￿ ￿. This can happen if and only if
￿b(1 ￿ ￿)￿1g + ￿b￿￿1b + (1 ￿ ￿b)(1 ￿ ￿)￿0g + (1 ￿ ￿b)￿￿0b
￿ ￿g￿￿1g + ￿g(1 ￿ ￿)￿1b + (1 ￿ ￿g)￿￿0g + (1 ￿ ￿g)(1 ￿ ￿)￿0b
which can be rearranged as follows:
(￿1b ￿ ￿0b)[￿(￿g + ￿b) ￿ ￿g] ￿ (￿1g ￿ ￿0g)[￿￿g ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿b] ￿ (￿0b ￿ ￿0g)(2￿ ￿ 1)
Condition 1, implies that ￿(￿g +￿b)￿￿g < 0 and ￿￿g ￿(1￿￿)￿b > 2￿￿1. Thus the LHS is
negative. The ￿rst term on the RHS is positive. The second is positive or negative depending
on the sign of ￿0b ￿ ￿0g. If this is negative, then the RHS is positive. If, on the other hand,
￿0b ￿ ￿0g > 0, then note further that ￿1g ￿ ￿0g ￿ ￿0b ￿ ￿0g and ￿￿g ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿b > 2￿ ￿ 1:
Thus the RHS is still positive. Thus, we have a contradiction, unless both the sides of the
32inequality are exactly zero, which happens only when ￿1b = ￿0b = ￿0g = ￿1g which makes
the equilibrium uninformative. This shows that r(a = 1;v = 1) > ￿ > r(a = 0;v = 1). The
case for r(a = 1;v = 0) < r(a = 0;v = 0) is symmetric.
Given this, we now have a strict ordering on reputational payo⁄di⁄erences as well:￿r1g >
￿r1b > ￿r0b > ￿r0g; in turn implying a strict ordering on the total payo⁄ di⁄erential:
￿u1g > ￿u1b > ￿u0b > ￿u0g.
If there exists an informative equilibrium it must be that￿u1g ￿ 0 and ￿u0g ￿ 0:We now
show that if p is small enough, the condition ￿ug1 ￿ 0 is violated. For this, ￿rst note that,
since ￿￿0b < 0, for small enough p, it must be the case that 0 > ￿u0b > ￿u0g, implying that
￿0b = ￿0g = 0, which then implies that:
max
￿1g;￿1b
r(a = 1;v = 0) = r(a = 1;v = 0j￿1g = 1;￿1b = 0) =
(1 ￿ ￿g)￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿g)￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿b)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
min
￿1g;￿1b
r(a = 0;v = 0) = r(a = 0;v = 0j￿1g = ￿1b = 0) = ￿
Hence,
r(a = 1;v = 0) ￿ r(a = 0;v = 0) ￿
(1 ￿ ￿g)￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿g)￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿b)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿
which is negative if
(1 ￿ ￿g)￿ < (1 ￿ ￿b)(1 ￿ ￿);
which is guaranteed under condition (1). Therefore,
lim
p!0
￿ug1 = (1￿￿)[r(a = 1;v = 0) ￿ r(a = 0;v = 0)] ￿
(1 ￿ ￿g)￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿g)￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿b)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿ < 0
This completes the proof of the ￿rst part of the result.
Second part of the proposition: Since ￿0g = 1, ￿u0g ￿ 0. Since ￿￿0g < 0, it must
be the case that ￿r0g > 0. We shall show that for su¢ ciently extreme p, this condition is
violated, because r(a = 1;v = 1) < ￿ < r(a = 0;v = 1) in this equilibrium. To see, assume
to the contrary that r(a = 1;v = 1) ￿ ￿. Utilizing the expression derived in the proof of
Proposition 8, we know that for any ￿sz, this is equivalent to:
(￿1b ￿ ￿0b)[￿(￿g + ￿b) ￿ ￿g] ￿ (￿1g ￿ ￿0g)[￿￿g ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿b] ￿ (￿0b ￿ ￿0g)(2￿ ￿ 1)
Substituting in equilibrium values gives: ￿(￿g+￿b)￿￿g ￿ ￿￿g￿(1￿￿)￿b, which is impossible
since ￿(￿g+￿b)￿￿g < 0 and ￿￿g￿(1￿￿)￿b > 0. For p ! 1, ￿r0g ! r(a = 1;v = 1)￿r(a =
0;v = 1) < 0 which violates ￿r0g > 0.
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